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This paper provides an overview of verbal markers of evidentiality in Early 
Modern German (1650-1800) in light of Boye’s propositional scope 
hypothesis. The markers under investigation include the semi-auxiliary 
scheinen ‘to shine, appear, seem’ and the perception verbs sehen ‘see’ and 
hören ‘hear.’ It is shown that, although Boye’s hypothesis sheds new light on 
and calls into question previous diachronic accounts of scheinen, it appears 
not to fully account for why cases where perception verbs do not scope over 
propositions are also found with evidential readings in light of the larger 
discourse context. It will be shown that Boye’s hypothesis is still feasible 
when such contexts are taken into account. Data are drawn from the German 
Manchester Corpus (GerManC), a representative multi-register corpus of 
Early Modern German from 1650 to 1800.  
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1. Introduction 
The current study is an investigation of evidential markers – items that encode 
the evidence speakers or writers have for the statements they make – in Early 
Modern German (1650-1800), with a focus on examining diachronic data in 
light of Boye’s (2010a, 2010b, 2012) hypothesis that evidential markers have 
scope over propositions but not states-of-affairs.  There is little agreement 
among typologists as to how to delineate the category of evidentiality. Some 
argue that evidentiality should be solely a grammatical category (Aikhenvald 
2004), while others admit a broad range of grammatical and lexical markers 
into the category (Chafe 1986). The most recent contribution to this discussion 
is Boye (2012), who argues that the key to understanding evidentiality is not a 
matter of grammar vs. lexicon, but rather whether an alleged evidential marker 
has scope over a proposition. This notion has yet to be examined in the light of 
diachronic data. So even historical studies of evidentiality in German (Diewald 
& Smirnova 2010; Whitt 2010) do not always approach evidentiality with the 
same criteria of analyzing evidential constructions. The current study will 
examine a range of previously studied grammatical(ized) and lexical(ized) 
markers of evidential meaning in view of Boye’s claims, showing how 
previous accounts of these markers are sometimes too narrow in their 
approach, while also demonstrating how Boye’s model does not account fully 
for the broader discourse context in which evidential items occur, but 
nevertheless serves as a useful analytic tool when taking this context into 
consideration. The markers under investigation are scheinen ‘to shine, seem’ 
(Diewald & Smirnova 2010) and the perception verbs sehen ‘to see’ and hören 
‘to hear’ (Whitt 2010). Data are drawn from the German Manchester Corpus 
(or GerManC), a corpus of Early Modern German from 1650 to 1800 (Durrell 
et al. 2012; Scheible et al. 2012).1 This corpus provides a broad sampling of 
texts from a number of different registers, allowing the possibility of register 
variation to be considered. Previous diachronically-oriented studies on 
evidentiality in German did not have the GerManC Corpus at their disposal, 
and the current investigation is the first to exploit this resource to these ends. 
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are a pivotal time in the history of 
German, as this is when the Modern Standard language comes into its own as a 
fully-fledged Kultursprache ‘cultural language’ through the acceptance and 
codification of certain norms throughout the German-speaking realm  (Roelcke 
1998, 813; Elspaß 2008, 4-6; von Polenz 2013, 1-2), as well as a period when 
grammaticalization is particularly active in the verbal system (Diewald & 
Smirnova 2010). 
 
2. Evidentiality in German 
Evidentiality is a deictic process where speakers indicate the source of 
information for making a claim: evidential utterances “typically include 
indicators pointing directly to particular sources or away from potential 
sources, as the speaker takes a particular point of view in describing an action” 
(Joseph 2003, 308). In a sentence such as Ich habe gehört, dass Diana den Zug 
verpasst hat ‘I heard that Diana missed the train,’ for example, the speaker 
points to hearsay as her source of information for the proposition Diana hat 
den Zug verpasst ‘Diana missed the train.’ Both Anderson (1986) and Willett 
(1988) constitute early studies seeking to explain how such a process can be 
realized in a range of languages. Anderson (1986, 274-275) made an early 
attempt to explicate what a “prototypical” evidential marker looks like: (a) it 
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shows the “justification” the speaker has for a “factual claim”; (b) it is not the 
main predication of the clause, but is rather a “specification added to a claim 
about something else” (emphasis Anderson’s); (c) the indication of evidence is 
part of the primary meaning rather than a pragmatic inference; and (d) 
morphologically, evidentials can be either free syntactic elements, inflections, 
or clitics (but not compounds or derivations). Anderson’s criteria have not gone 
unquestioned, especially concerning the nature of grammatical marking and 
evidential meaning not being part of the primary meaning (Aikhenvald 2003; 
Boye & Harder 2009). Looking back at three decades of evidentiality studies, 
Boye (2010a, 290-291; 2012, 185-187) has noted that beyond the general 
consensus that evidentiality is the marking of speaker evidence, there is little 
agreement as to whether what is meant by “evidential” is evidence for 
propositions, claims, assertions, statements, actions, speech acts, or states-of-
affairs. Boye (2010a, 2010b, 2012) thus proposes a framework in which 
evidential markers have scope over propositions, not states-of-affairs. 
 To illustrate how Boye distinguishes between propositions and states-
of-affairs, consider (1) and (2) (taken from Boye 2010a, 293 and Boye 2012, 
192): 
(1) a. I saw him write a letter. 
 b. I heard him yell. 
(2) a. I saw that he was writing a letter. 
 b. I heard that he was yelling. 
According to Boye, the accusative and infinitive constructions (also known as 
accusativus-cum-infinitivo, or AcI, constructions) in (1) denote states-of-
affairs, while the complement clauses in (2) contain propositions. The 
difference, Boye argues, is that states-of-affairs can be “said to occur” and do 
not have a truth value (Boye 2012, 193); they do not “stipulate the existence of 
an extra-linguistic referent” (Boye 2010b, 415). They can be thought of as 
“actions” occurring at a specific point in time (Boye 2010a, 293). Propositions, 
on the other hand, represent “pieces of knowledge” that have been acquired 
and contain a truth value. Unlike states-of-affairs, they do code the intention to 
refer to extra-linguistic referents. They can be thought of as “facts” that are 
either true or not true (Boye 2010a, 293; cf. Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008, 
144, 166). Consequently, they can be subject to epistemic qualification, 
whereas states-of-affairs cannot (contrast I heard that he was probably yelling 
vs. ?I heard him probably yell, for example). So in (1), what is perceived – 
writing a letter and yelling – is inexorably tied in with the concurrent 
perceptive act and does not constitute a separate “piece of knowledge” or 
“fact” resulting from the perception; that this perception provides justification 
for the assertion of writing in (1a) and yelling in (1b) is implied but it is not 
expressed (Boye 2012, 213; cf. Anderson’s 1986 view that pragmatic inference 
does not constitute a part of evidentiality). In (2), on the other hand, the 
delineation between the acquisition of knowledge (indicated by the perception 
verb in the matrix clause) and “pieces of knowledge” or “facts” acquired is 
made explicit by the complement clauses, the contents of which do have a truth 
value and which stipulate that someone was writing a letter or yelling (see 
Boye 2010b for a much fuller discussion of the ontological differences between 
states-of-affairs and propositions). Given this criterion, Boye (2012, 183ff.) 
concludes that scope over propositions is of primary importance, not whether 
something is grammatical or lexical. This is a radical departure within 
evidentiality studies, most notably from Aikhenvald (2004), who argues that 
evidentiality is solely a grammatical phenomenon. Even Diewald and 
Smirnova (2010), who adopt a less stringent position for German (which lacks 
inflectional evidential marking), maintain the distinction between 
grammaticalized constructions and more lexical “evidential strategies,” i.e., 
items which are not grammaticalized but which often signal evidential meaning 
(such as certain uses of perception verbs) (40ff.). Leiss (2011) also maintains a 
distinction between grammatical and lexical evidential markers in German – 
epistemic modal verbs versus adverbs, for example – given the more 
complicated deictic operations involved with the former. 
 Even though German does not encode expressions of speaker evidence 
in verbal morphology, recent studies (Diewald & Smirnova 2010; Whitt 2010) 
have shown it has developed both lexical and more grammaticalized means of 
signifying evidential meaning. The perception verbs sehen and hören are an 
example of lexical means of expressing speaker evidence (what Diewald and 
Smirnova (2010, 45) would call “stereotypical constructions,” evidential 
strategies involving the repeated use of certain lexical constructions or 
collocations). On the other hand, the semi-auxiliary scheinen  is an  example of 
a more grammaticalized realizations of evidentiality because it has evolved 
from the more concrete, lexical sense of ‘to shine.’ This distinction is – to some 
extent – rendered irrelevant when determining whether something expresses 
evidential meaning or not in Boye’s framework. 
 In the typological literature on evidentiality, a two-way distinction is 
often drawn between direct and indirect evidence (Palmer 1986; Willett 1988; 
Lazard 2001; Plungian 2001). Direct evidence is acquired through first-hand 
perceptual experience, whereas indirect evidence can be further subdivided into 
inference and mediated information, that is, information received from 
	  
	  
someone else. In (3) the perception verb sehen is a marker of direct perceptual 
evidence. Scheinen in (4) functions as a marker of inferential evidentiality, and 
in (5), hören is an indicator of mediated information:  
(3) Ich blikte hinab und sah, daß Malgen mit einem Glase Wasser sehr 
 beschäftigt heraufstieg. 
 ‘I looked up and saw that Malgen came up very busily with a glass of 
 water.’ 
 (NARR_P3_OMD_1774_Werther: Johann  Wolfgang von Goethe, Die 
 Leiden des jungen Werthers, Leipzig 1774)2 
(4) Leider scheint sie diese Krankheit auf ihren Sohn fortgeerbt zu haben . 
 . . 
‘Unfortunately she seems to have passed this sickness on to her son . . .’ 
(NARR_P3_NoD_1790_AntonReiser: Karl Philipp Moritz, Anton 
Reiser, Berlin 1790) 
(5) ich höre/ es wird sehr viel Geld von den neuen Zöllen einkommen. 
‘I hear there will be a lot of money coming in from the new customs 
duties.’ 
(DRAM_P1_OMD_1683_Masaniello: Christian Weise, Trauer-Spiel 
Von dem Neapolitanischen Haupt-Rebellen Masaniello, Zittau 1683) 
In (3), the speaker indicates he has first-hand visual evidence for the 
proposition that Malgen is ascending with a glass of water. In (4), on the other 
hand, there is an inference (no doubt based on observable facts) that someone 
has inherited a disease from his mother. And in (5) the source of information 
about the earnings of new customs duties is marked as hearsay. 
 The paper is structured as follows. In Section 3 the structure of the 
GerManC Corpus is discussed. Section 4 provides in-depth accounts of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2Data from the GerManC corpus are cited using the file name and basic 
bibliographic information. In (3), for example, the file name contains 
information on the register (NARR = Narrative), the period (P3 = 1750-1800), 
the region of origin (OMD = Ostmitteldeutsch ‘East Central German’), year of 
publication (1774), and some bibliographical elements of author, title, and 
publication location. See Section 3 for a full description of the corpus structure. 
scheinen, sehen, and hören, comparing the results of previous studies with 
Boye’s propositional scope hypothesis. Throughout the discussion, the 
possibility of register-specific uses of evidential markers during the Early 
Modern Period is kept in mind. 
 
3. The Data: The GerManC Corpus 
Data for the current study are drawn from the German Manchester Corpus 
(GerManC), a multi-register representative corpus of Early Modern German 
(Durrell et al. 2012; Scheible et al. 2012). The corpus covers the years 1650 to 
1800 and is subdivided into three sub-periods of 50 years each. Texts are also 
classified along the lines of the five major dialect regions of Germany.3 Finally, 
texts were classified along the lines of print-oriented and orally-oriented 
registers.4 Table 1 summarizes the structure of the corpus: 
Table 1. The Structure of the GerManC Corpus 










East Central German 
West Central German 
East Upper German 
West Upper German 
print-oriented: 
     Humanities 
     Legal 
     Narrative 
     Scientific 
orally-oriented: 
     Drama 
     Letters 
     Newspapers 
     Sermons 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3No correlation could be found between regional variation and the use of 
evidential markers in the present study.	  
4This is based on Koch & Oesterreicher’s (1985) discussion of written 
representations of spoken language. Although not mirroring speech exactly, 
some registers such as dramas come nearer than more formal academic 
registers (like scientific texts) to mirroring the spoken language. The 
newspapers are considered orally-oriented here because they are written 
transcriptions of oral reports provided by reporters via Depeschen ‘dispatches.’ 
	  
	  
Three text extracts of roughly 2,000 words each were taken for each possible 
period/region/register configuration, e.g. there are three 2,000 word samples of 
East Central German legal texts dating from 1750-1800. This brings the total 
word count of the corpus to approximately 720,000 words. 
 The items under investigation – scheinen, sehen, and hören, – were 
extracted from the corpus using the WordSmith 6 concordancer (Scott 2012). 
All spelling variants and morphological forms were considered and analyzed 
with reference to the formal criteria established in the literature on what 
constitutes an evidential value or not (Diewald & Smirnova 2010; Whitt 2010): 
namely, the syntactic constellation in which these verbs appear often goes 
hand-in-hand with whether they are evidential markers or not. Boye’s 
framework is then applied to show how scheinen can serve an evidential 
function in more contexts than previously claimed by Diewald & Smirnova 
(2010). Then Boye’s hypothesis itself appears brought into question when the 
discourse context of certain perception verb constructions that Boye does not 
find evidential nevertheless suggest an evidential reading. Ultimately, however, 
such uses are shown to be compatible with Boye’s notion of propositional 
scope. 
 
4. Analysis and Results 
 
4.1 Inferential Evidentiality and Grammaticalization: The Case of scheinen 
The verb scheinen is one of the main verbal markers of speaker inference in 
Modern German. In its lexical use as an intransitive main verb it means ‘to 
shine’ (as in Das Licht scheint sehr hell ‘The light is shining very brightly’), 
but more often, it means ‘to seem, appear.’ It is during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries  that its full range of evidential uses comes into being 
(Diewald & Smirnova 2010, 254ff.). A number of different syntactic 
constellations are involved: a copula, a compound copula with infinitive sein 
‘to be,’ a zu-infinitive other than sein, a complement clause (often introduced 
by the complementizer dass ‘that’), and a parenthetical. Its overall token 
frequency in the GerManC corpus is 309. 
4.1.1 Copulas and the zu-Infinitive Construction 
In Diewald and Smirnova’s (2010) account of scheinen’s evolution into a 
grammaticalized marker of evidentiality, the copula construction (as seen in (6) 
and (7)) – which dates back to the Middle High German period (255-257) – is 
held to be the historical precursor of the zu-Infinitive construction, which first 
occurred with the verb sein ‘to be’ ((8) and (9)) and later took other verbs as 
infinitival complements ((10) and (11)).5 
(6) . . . hab aber noch nicht recht mit ihr kundschafft gemacht, sie scheindt 
 gegen mich gar forchtsam. 
 ‘. . . I have not yet properly made her acquaintance, she seems quite 
 afraid of me.’ 
 (LETT_P1_WMD_1663_Pfalz: Letter from  Elector Karl Ludwig von 
 der Pfalz to Elisabeth Charlotte von der Pflaz, June 1663) 
(7) Die Kindbetterin schien bey dem Anblick der Unbekannten etwas 
 betroffen, vermuthlich aus Verwunderung, daß die Nixe so treulich 
 Wort gehalten hatte. 
‘The woman who just gave birth appeared shocked at the sight of the 
strangers, probably due to amazement that the mermaid had stayed true 
to her word.’ 
(NARR_P3_OMD_1782_Volksmaerchen: Johann  Karl August 
Musäus, Volksmärchen der Deutschen, Gotha 1782) 
(8) Eine davon scheinet von einer römischen Kaiserin, und eine von 
 ANTONIO Philosopho, zu seyn. 
‘One of them [a statue] appears to be of a Roman Empress, and one of 
them appears of the philosopher Antonius.’ 
(HUMA_P3_WOD_1768_Roemer:  Christian Hans Hanßelmann, 
Beweiß, wie weit der Römer Macht, in den  mit verschiedenen 
teutschen Völkern geführten Kriegen . . ., Halle 1768) 
 (9) In Schweden scheint der Revolutionsgeist rege zu werden. 
 ‘The spirit of revolution appears to be astir in Sweden.’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5In line with previous studies (Diewald & Smirnova 2010, 177-179, 251ff.; cf. 
de Haan 2007, 140-141), the zu sein ‘to be’ construction in (8) is kept separate 
from that in (9) because it is diachronically older and functioned as a sort of 
transitional construction between the copula use in (6) and (7) and the zu-
Infinitive construction in (9). 
	  
	  
 (NEWS_P3_WMD_1793_mainz: Die neue Mainzer Zeitung oder der 
Volksfreund, no. 13, 29 January 1793) 
In (6) and (7), the indication of some appearance being emanated from the 
subject is in focus. However, there is a second component present as well 
which paves the way for evidential meaning, as scheinen in these instances 
“describes not only a visual effect produced by a subject (like Sonne ‘sun’ or 
Mond ‘moon’) but rather an impression which is caused by the subject referent 
by means of its visual (or other) appearance” (Diewald & Smirnova 2010, 178-
179). That is, the woman’s physical demeanor and behavior is projecting an 
appearance of fear on the perceiver in (6), while the woman in (7) is projecting 
an appearance of amazement. As a mere impression is being projected by the 
grammatical subject and inferential meaning is supposedly absent, Diewald and 
Smirnova do not consider these to be evidential, and Boye’s propositional 
scope criterion appears to support this, as (6) and (7) only indicate states-of-
affairs (the appearance of fear and amazement) rather than propositions. Even 
so, the appearance of these copula constructions with scheinen provide a 
conceptual link between an emanating subject and an observer, one who can 
draw inferences based on appearances. This is what is then indicated with the 
zu-Infinitive construction, when a second proposition is made explicit through 
the use of a verbal infinitive complement introduced by the particle zu 
(Diewald & Smirnova 2010, 260ff.). The copula sein ‘to be’ is supposed to be 
the first verb to appear in this (compound copula) construction (de Haan 2007, 
140; Diewald & Smirnova 2010, 260), with other verbs quickly following suit. 
So in (8), for example, scheinen allows the speaker/writer to infer who exactly 
the objects of the sculpture are, while in (9), the reporter infers from ongoing 
events in Sweden that revolutionary sentiments are spreading. Rather than 
being the main (and only) predication indicating a visual appearance, scheinen 
serves the role of secondary predication in the zu-Infinitive constructions, 
allowing speakers to express their inferences about whatever is indicated by the 
zu-Infinitive and its respective complements (cf. Anderson 1986, 274). Rather 
than a mere adjectival or nominal complement, scheinen now has scope over 
an entire proposition and thus is free to serve an evidential function (Boye 
2010a). Through this process, grammaticalization was at work, as the meaning 
of ‘to shine’ and general visual appearance became bleached (acquiring the 
inferential evidential meaning in the process), restrictions on extrapositioning 
and valency went into effect, while syntactic restrictions on subject selection 
decreased (for a fuller account, see Diewald 2001, 91-93, and Diewald & 
Smirnova 2010, 177-191, 251-268). 
 The GerManC data confirm Diewald and Smirnova’s (2010, 263ff.) 
assertion (based on a different data set) that the eighteenth century is when 
these grammaticalization processes appear to have come into fruition, allowing 
the use of the evidential zu-Infinitive to increase in frequency and spread 
rapidly. Figure 1 provides a visualization of the raw counts of zu-Infinitive 
constructions in each of the three fifty-year periods covered by GerManC: 
Figure 1. Occurrences of evidential scheinen + zu-Infinitive contructions in the 
GerManC Corpus 
 
Whereas the period 1650 to 1700 attests only a few instances of evidential zu-
Infinitive constructions, the next two periods show that this construction’s 
frequency increases proportionally several hundredfold within the eighteenth 
century. A chi-square test with Yates’ correction for continuity reveals these 
increases to be statistically significant. For the zu-Infinitive construction 
involving sein, there is only a statistically significant difference for the entire 
period rather than for each incremental increase (that is, between 1650-1700 
and 1750-1800): χ2 = 6.721, df = 1, p = .009. On the other hand, the zu-
Infinitive construction involving other verbs shows a statistically significant 
increase between 1650-1700 and 1700-1750 (χ2 = 4.922, df = 1, p = .026), and 
even more so between 1700-1750 and 1750-1800 (χ2 = 18.615, df = 1, p = 
<.001). Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 262) speculate that this rapid increase 
was due to analogical transfer from the werden ‘to become’ + Infinitive 
construction (as in Diana wird den Zug verpassen ‘Diana is bound to miss the 
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evidentiality marker.6 Whether this was the casee or not lies beyond the 
parameters of the current study, but the data do at least confirm the diachronic 
account put forward by Diewald and Smirnova (2010). No connection between 
register and the grammaticalization of the zu-Infinitive could be established. 
 If one re-examines the copula and zu-Infinitive construction within light 
of Boye’s (2012) notion of propositional scope, even some of the former could 
be construed as attesting evidential meaning. Although scheinen in (6) and (7) 
does not appear to take a proposition in its scope, Boye (2012, 250ff.) notes 
that there are cases of epistemic markers (which include evidential expressions) 
“coercing” (253) a proposition where one is not overtly expressed: “even when 
epistemic expressions have less than a propositional construction in their 
semantic scope, their epistemic meanings are interpreted as having a 
proposition as their scope. More precisely, whatever is found in the explicit 
scope of a given epistemic meaning is interpreted as being part of the implicit 
propositional scope” (253). This coerced proposition must be identifiable in 
some way, however (254). Given the copula construction’s close affinity with 
the compound copula construction (where an explicit proposition does fall 
within the scope of scheinen), it may well be possible for propositional 
coercion to occur in at least some copular constructions, especially where an 
inference on the part of the speaker is suggested. Let us return to (6) and (7), 
where the adjectival complements are forchtsam ‘afraid’ and betroffen 
‘shocked,’ respectively. States of fear and of shock cannot be perceived 
directly or have visual appearances unto themselves; rather, one can display 
signs of fear or shock (e.g., facial expressions, flushed looks, mumbled speech) 
that are symptomatic of these states. An observer can then infer from these 
signs that the individual is in a state of fear or shock. Such is suggested by the 
discourse contexts surrounding (6) and (7), for in (6) the writer’s inference is 
based on the fact that his failed attempts to become acquainted with a Fraw 
Trelong ‘Mrs. Trelong’ are due to her fear of him, and he points to her 
incessant refusal to travel to Heidelberg as a sign of this fear. Similarly in (7), 
the speaker infers that the woman in childbed was in a state of shock because 
the mermaid’s words have proven true (which apparently was not expected). 
That there is an implicit proposition in both these instances is supported by the 
fact that these could be turned into compound copula constructions with the 
addition of zu sein, thus rendering the propositions overt. This still supports 
Diewald and Smirnova’s (2010) claim that the copula construction forms the 
historical (and conceptual) basis for the evolution of the zu-Infinitive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6In an earlier study, Diewald (2001) suggested that this analogical transfer was 
due to the grammaticalization of the epistemic modal verbs instead, but she has 
since changed her position. 
constructions, as these constructions allow simple adjective or nominal states 
indicated by sein to be inferred, and then eventually any sort of verbal action 
indicated by verbs other than sein. However, Boye’s notion of propositional 
coercion admits simple copula constructions into German’s evidential 
repertoire as well. 
 Not all cases of zu-Infinitive constructions, and certainly not all cases of 
copular uses of scheinen, are carriers of evidential meaning. Consider the 
following: 
(10) Hier scheinet die See gantz grün. 
 ‘Here the sea appears very green . . .’ 
 (SCIE_P2_WOD_1708_WunderbarenWelt: Everhard Gvern. Happelii, 
MUNDI MIRABILIS TRIPARTITI, Oder Wunderbaren Welt, Ulm 1708) 
(11) Was die Welt mit Gunst und Liebe allhier zu geben scheinet/ reisset sie 
nachgehends wie der arge Dieb an sich/ lasset dem Menschen nichts 
übrig. 
 ‘What the world appears to give here with grace and love, it 
subsequently snatches back like a wicked thief and leaves people with 
nothing.’ 
 (SERM_P2_OOD_1728_Verstellte: Aemilian Daneli, Der Verstellte 
einer gantzen Welt/ Denen Christen aber bekandte Pilger . . ., Vienna 
1728) 
In (10), scheinen functions merely to describe the physically perceivable color 
of the sea, while in (11), scheinen serves to indicate how things appear in 
contrast with how they actually are. As speaker inference is not involved in 
either case, evidential meaning is not present. Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 
183-185) ascribe this use of zu-Infinitive constructions to persistence in 
grammaticalization, where the more lexical semantics of an item are 
maintained even after the grammaticalization process has taken place. 
Regarding the copular construction, (10) contrasts with (6) and (7) not because 
of any sort of persistence or scope properties (a proposition could be “coerced” 
[Boye 2012, 253] here as well), but rather because of the semantics of the 
adjectival complement. Greenness is a physically perceivable quality, whereas 
conditions of fear and shock must be inferred from observable behavior. In 
both cases, the wider discourse context is necessary to determine whether 
evidential meaning is expressed. Quantitatively, the GerManC corpus attests 68 
	  
	  
uses of copular scheinen, with 17 (25%) signaling evidential meaning. 
Regarding the compound copular constructions with zu sein, 27 out of 60 
(45%) instances in GerManC express speaker/writer inference. Finally, 57 of 
the 80 (71.25%) zu-Infinitive constructions involving other verbs were found to 
be evidential. Although Diewald and Smirnova (2010) do not admit any 
copular constructions into the category of evidential markers, these data 
support their diachronic account of the zu-Infinitive construction developing 
evidential meaning: the zu-Infinitive construction involving verbs other than 
sein is a marker of speaker inference more often than when sein is in the 
infinitive, and in particular more often than any copular uses which may also 
be markers of speaker inference.7 By the end of the eighteenth century, 
scheinen + zu-Infinitive with verbs other than sein has become the preferred 
marker of speaker inference among this group of related constructions. 
4.1.2 Complement Clauses and Parentheticals 
There are two other construction types relevant to the function of scheinen as 
an evidential marker: complement clauses (12) and parentheticals ((13) and 
(14)): 
(12) dazu ich dann nun vermeine leichter zu gelangen/ weil es scheinet/ daß 
unsere heurat/ nach dem tode des Königs Amraphel von Elam/ nicht so 
eiferig bei unserem hofe mehr getrieben wird. 
 ‘In addition I suppose it will be easier to succeed because it seems that 
our wedding is no longer being so fervently planned for at our court 
since the death of King Amphrael of Elam.’ 
 (NARR_P1_OOD_1669_Aramena: Anton Ulrich (von Braunschweig), 
Die durchleuchtige Syrerin Aramena Der Zweyte Theil: Der 
Beschwiegerten Freundschaft gewidmet, Nuremberg 1669) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 of the 17 (53%) evidential uses of copular scheinen in GerManC date from 
1750-1800, which confirms Diewald and Smirnova’s (2010, 258) finding that 
copular uses of scheinen occur in an increasingly broader range of contexts in 
the Early Modern period. That is, complements are no longer restricted to 
adjectives that merely indicate a physical state (such as grün in (10)), but can 
also involve adjectives denoting perceptual effects and illusory appearances, as 
indicated in (6) and (7). Even so, none of these uses would be considered 
evidential by Diewald and Smirnova. 
(13) ich aber mein verhoffen/ Starrt eine lange Zeit/ von diesem Blitz 
getroffen/ Biß ich mich vnterwand zu lindern jhren Grimm Doch/ wie 
es schien/ vmbsonst. 
‘In hope I stared for a long time, affected by this flash of light, until I 
strove to abate her anger but, as it seemed, in vain.’ 
(DRAM_P1_OMD_1657_Cardenio: Andreas Gryphius, Cardenio vnd 
Celinde, Oder Unglücklich Verliebete, Breslau 1657) 
(14) Gott will so scheint's nicht haben dass ich Autor werden soll. 
 ‘God does not, it seems, intend for me to become an author.’ 
 (LETT_P3_WMD_1768_Goethe: Letter from JohannWolfgang von 
Goethe, Janurary 1769) 
Scheinen in (12) clearly takes a proposition indicated by the complement 
clause in its scope: that wedding planning is no longer a priority at court. 
Diewald and Smirnova (2010), however, argue against an evidential 
interpretation of complement clauses:  
What scheinen seems to express in constructions with complement clauses is 
the impression which is produced (on some observer) by some entity or 
situation. The impression may be more or less concrete, and it may be more or 
less plausible. Every actual interpretation of the evaluative or epistemic status 
of the represented impression is supported by further contextual devices and 
does not arise from the verb scheinen alone (179-180). 
By “further contextual devices” Diewald and Smirnova are referring to matters 
such as the tense and mood of the verb in the complement clause, which often 
occurs in the subjunctive (2010, 180), hence rendering the proposition non-
factual and non-evidential. This is true enough, but it does not account for 
cases where the verb is in the indicative. A total of 15 of the 55 (27.3%) 
scheinen complement clauses in GerManC were found to contain verbs in the 
indicative, and as can be seen (12), one is hard pressed not to see scheinen as 
scoping over the following propositional content and serving as a secondary 
predication. In (12), the speaker infers that since the king’s death an upcoming 
wedding is no longer on everyone’s minds because very little is actually being 
said about it.  Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 259) acknowledge this 
construction as a “potential” indicator of evidence, but do not actually call it an 
evidential marker. But as in (10) and (11), “further contextual devices” are 
required to determine whether a zu-Infinitive construction is used as an 
evidential, as the following clause immediately contradicts the impression 
	  
	  
signaled by scheinen. Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 183-185) simply write this 
off as persistence in grammaticalization. Specifically, this means that cases 
such as (11), in which a mere impression rather than an inference is indicated, 
older meanings “persist” despite the fact that the scheinen + zu-Infinitive 
construction has grammaticalized into a marker of speaker inference. This is 
true enough, but the exception made for such uses is possibly due to their 
larger agenda of arguing for a coherent grammaticalization scenario involving 
not only scheinen, but also werden ‘to become,’ drohen ‘to threaten,’ and 
versprechen ‘to promise’ with infinitive complements as the genesis of a 
grammatical(ized) paradigm of evidentiality in present-day German. In the 
process, they do not even acknowledge the possibility of complement 
constructions potentially serving as “stereotypical constructions” or “evidential 
strategies” (40-46). Example (12) should make clear that, although perhaps not 
as frequently used as zu-Infinitive constructions, complement clauses with 
scheinen in the matrix clause do express speaker evidence in some instances, at 
least insofar as the GerManC data are concerned.8 
 Parenthetical uses of scheinen, as seen in (13) and (14), are given very 
little attention by Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 180, 253), who view such 
parentheticals as adverbial because they are not syntactically integrated into the 
clause and demonstrate notably different distributional properties. Even so, 
they note these parentheticals’ semantic and functional affinity with copular 
and zu-Infinitive constructions (180). That some parentheticals (especially wie-
type parentheticals like in (13)) bear a formal resemblance to adverbials is 
indisputable (d’Avis 2005, 266-269), especially in that they can be placed at 
the front of a clause whereas more prototypical parentheticals, such as (14), 
cannot be. Haider (2005, 283ff.), however, points to a key functional difference 
between true wie-type adverbials and adverbial-like wie-type parentheticals: 
whereas the former serve merely to modify the nature of the verbal action 
indicated in the clause, wie-type parentheticals serve a redekommentierende 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8To their credit, Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 253ff.) dispel the long-held 
belief that scheinen followed by a complement clause dates only from the 
eighteenth century (see, for example, de Haan 2007) by providing examples of 
variants of this construction in Old and Middle High German. Indeed, 
sometimes their glosses betray an evidential reading, even if they do not 
acknowledge this. For instance, Example 53 (p. 256) is Das schinet uch an 
uwerm libe wol das ir darumb nit enwißent (Lanc 283, 12, MHDWB) ‘It is also 
obvious from your body that you do not know about it,’ where the body 
language of the interloctor serves as the speaker’s evidence for the claim that 
the former lacks certain knowledge. 
‘discourse commenting’ function.9 These parentheticals allow the 
speaker/writer to comment on the (propositional) content of the clause in which 
they are embedded (cf. Brinton’s 2008 discussion of ‘comment clauses’). This 
is the exact function found with the parentheticals involving scheinen: the 
speaker infers that his actions to abate a woman’s anger have been in vain in 
(13), and in (14), Goethe expresses his frustration with editors in Leipzig 
fussing over his work and infers that God is hindering his efforts to become an 
established author. Although the diachronic origins of this construction type 
remain unclear, both Diewald and Smirnova (2010, 253), who note such 
parentheticals first emerged in the Early New High period, and de Haan (2007) 
suggest these evolved from the the matrix clause of complement clause 
constructions (cf. Thompson & Mulac 1991).10 There are only 9 such 
parentheticals (8 being wie-type constructions) in the GerManC Corpus.   
4.1.3 Summary of scheinen 
Scheinen serves the evidential function of marking speaker inference in a 
number of different constructions, some of which – copulas and complement 
clauses – were claimed by Diewald and Smirnova (2010) not to be evidential. 
In all cases, the larger syntactic and discourse context must be consulted to 
determine whether scheinen is evidential or not. Boye’s (2012) notion of 
propositional coercion allows an implied proposition over which scheinen has 
scope to be coerced with adjectival and nominal copular complements, hence 
the close conceptual and diachronic affinity with compound copulas involving 
zu + sein. This then gave rise to zu-Infinitive constructions involving other 
verbs, and the GerManC data confirm Diewald and Smirnova’s (2010) account 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9Haider’s (2005, 283) example of a wie-type adverbial is Es wurde (so), wie sie 
es wollte, erledigt ‘It was completed as she desired,’ where the adverbial wie 
sie es wollte ‘as she wanted it’ (literal gloss) specifies the manner in which the 
action was completed. However, in Er wurde, wie gemunkelt wird, bestochen 
‘He was, as rumor has it, bribed,’ the parenthetical in no way modifies the 
nature of the bribery, but rather allows the speaker to comment on the source of 
information (a rumor, hearsay) for the proposition Er wurde bestochen ‘He was 
bribed.’ 
10Thompson and Mulac’s (1991) hypothesis that matrix clauses give rise to 
epistemic parentheticals (at least in English) has recently been brought into 
question by Brinton (2008) and López-Couso and Méndez-Naya (2014), who 
note that epistemic parentheticals can have a variety of diachronic origins, and 
in the case of English seem, such parentheticals were found to derive from both 
adverbial and complement constructions. This is also likely with German, 
although there is not enough data in GerManC to investigate this further.	  
	  
	  
that the frequency of this construction increased significantly during the 
eighteenth century. The GerManC data reveal clear propositional scope and 
contextual clues suggestive that at least some complement clause constructions 
can serve an evidential function as well. Finally, parentheticals involving 
scheinen were also shown to be evidentials that, although bearing some 
resemblance to adverbs, have clear formal and functional differences: they 
scope over an entire proposition rather than merely the verbal predicate, and 
they serve a discourse commenting function of marking speaker evidence as 
opposed to modifying the nature of the verbal action. 
4.2 Lexical Evidentials: The Perception Verbs sehen and hören 
I turn now to two perception verbs functioning as evidential markers in Early 
Modern German: sehen ‘ to see’ and hören ‘to hear.’ Sehen ‘to see’ can serve 
as a marker of direct visual perception as well as speaker inference, and it is the 
most frequently used of German perception verbs (the total token count in the 
corpus is 1,502). Hören ‘to hear’ can mark not only direct auditory perception 
as evidence, but also hearsay (mediated) evidence. Its overall token frequency 
is 454, over two-thirds less than the frequency of sehen. Boye’s (2010a, 2010b, 
2012) propositional scope criterion will be contrasted with the findings of 
previous studies of perception verbs, namely Whitt (2009, 2010). As with 
scheinen, a number of different complementation patterns are involved in the 
expression of evidential meaning: complement clauses, wh-complement 
clauses, parentheticals, direct object (AcI) constructions, and constructions 
external to the clause for which there is evidence. 
4.2.1 Complement Clauses and Parentheticals 
Sehen and hören occur in complement clause constructions (see (15) and (16)) 
with the complementizer dass ‘that’ sometimes left unexpressed. Both also 
occur in complement clauses introduced by a wh-complementizer (wie ‘how,’ 
wo ‘where,’ wer ‘who,’ warum ‘why’), as in (17) and (18), and in 
parentheticals ((19) and (20)): 
(15) Ich seh/ daß du verliebet bist. 
‘I see that you’re in love.’ 
(DRAM_P1_NoD_1700_Freyheit: Ortensio Mauro, Der in seiner 
 Freyheit vergnügte ALCIBIADES, Braunschweig 1700) 
(16) weil ich höre daß Master Popes Dunciade in Hamburg aufgeleget 
worden . . . 
 ‘Because I hear that Master Pope’s Dunciade was published in 
Hamburg . . .’ 
 (LETT_P2_WOD_1732_Bodmer: Letter from Johann Jakob Bodmer to 
Johann Christoph Gottsched, 1732) 
(17) weil man nicht ungewöhnlich siehet/ wie sich diese zwey Thiere in 
einem Hause wol vertragen/ solche Feindschafft nicht natürlich/ wie 
zwischen Hund und Hasen/ sondern mehrentheils aus Beneidung des 
Essens sey . . . 
‘Because it’s not unusual to see how these two animals tolerate one 
another in the same house, and such an animosity is not natural – as is 
the animosity between dog and rabbit – but rather supposedly has more 
to do with begrudging food to one another . . .’ 
(NARR_P1_WMD_1696_DerEdelmann: Paul Winkler, Der Edelmann, 
Frankfurt 1696)11 
(18) Er räuspert sich und macht zum Reden sich bereit/ Still! daß ich hör 
wie er sein eignes Lob außschreyt. 
 ‘He is clearing his throat and preparing to speak. Be quiet! So I hear 
how he shouts out his own praise.’ 
 (DRAM_P1_WMD_1668_ChristRuehmendes: Johann Rudolf Karsten, 
Christ-rühmendes Schau-Spiel, Frankfurt 1668) 
(19) sie zweifelten nicht, wie wir aus unserm Text sehen, daß die 
Ermordnung jener Galiläer, und der Einsturz jenes Thurms, der 18. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11As evidentiality concerns the speaker’s expression of his or her evidence a 
proposition, perception verbs such as sehen and hören are generally only 
evidential when occurring with first-person grammatical subjects (Whitt 2009, 
2010; cf. Gisborne & Holmes 2007, 3-4). However, the third-person 
impersonal subject man ‘one’ can often be used in an interpersonal function 
with a meaning similar to wir ‘we’ (Eisenberg 1999, 171; Durrell 2011, 113-
114). In the GerManC data, the occurrence of man as subject to sehen and 
hören was deemed evidential because ultimately it is the speaker or writer who 
is pointing to the evidence, rather than some other third-person subject. See 
Whitt (2011, 2014) for a fuller discussion of singular versus plural first-person 
subjects with perception verbs. 
	  
	  
Menschen erschlug, ein göttliches Verhängnis über diese Personen 
gewesen sey. 
‘They had no doubt, as we see from our text, that the murder of those 
Gallileans and the collapse of that tower, which killed eighteen people, 
was a divine judgment visited upon these people.’ 
(SERM_P3_WMD_1780_Feuersbrunst: Justus Christoph Krafft, Eine 
Predigt über Luc. 13, 1-5 mit Beziehung auf die Feuersbrunst, 
Frankfurt 1781) 
(20) Eben jetzt kombt Bericht. daß die gemelte Brod-Wägen mit einer 
Convoy von 500. Mann/ nacher Ehingen abfahren sollen/ vnd wie 
einige wollen/ so sollen die Chur-Bayrischen Völcker in Ehingen/ 
Riedlingen vnd Munderkingen verlegt werden/ so man morgen hören 
wird. 
 ‘Just now comes a dispatch that the aforementioned bread carts with a 
convoy of 500 men is to leave for Ehingen afterwards, and as several 
claim, the Bavarian troops in Ehingen, Riedlingen, and Munderkingen 
are to be relocated, as will be heard tomorrow.’ 
 (NEWS_P2_OOD_1702_muenchen2: Mercurii Relation, oder 
Wochentliche Ordinari Zeitungen (no. 48), November 1702) 
Examples (15) and (16) contain explicit propositions in the complement clause 
introduced by dass, and the perception verbs in the matrix clause provide the 
evidence for these propositions (Boye 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 208ff.; see also 
discussion of Examples (1) and (2)). However, both sehen in (15) and hören in 
(16) function as markers of indirect evidence in these types of constructions: 
the speaker infers (no doubt from visual clues) that her interlocutor is in love in 
(15), and hearsay in (16) is the basis on which Bodmer reports the publication 
location of Pope’s Dunciade. This ability to mark indirect evidence (based on 
perceptual cues) is thanks to these verbs’ highly polysemous and metaphorical 
nature both within and without the evidential domain (Viberg 1983; Falkenberg 
1989; Matlock 1989; Sweetser 1990, 23ff.; Harm 2000; Whitt 2010). Indirect 
evidence is also indicated by the parentheticals in (19) and (20), which similar 
to parenthetical scheinen, allow speakers/writers to comment on the 
propositional content of the clauses in which they are embedded. In (19), the 
writer indicates that an inference can be drawn from the Biblical text that the 
deaths described were a result of divine judgment, while in (20), the fate of the 
bread carts and moving Bavarian troops are indicated as mediated information. 
Of course, as was seen in example (3), direct visual evidence without regard to 
inference can be indicated in these constructions as well. But when perception 
verbs are used to indicate indirect forms of evidence, complementizer clauses 
and parentheticals are the main construction types used to do so (Whitt 2009, 
2010). No diachronic trend could be found with either of these constructions, 
which occur through all periods of the GerManC corpus. A total of 85 
evidential dass-complementizer clauses (5.7% of total token count) and 18 
evidential parentheticals (1.2%) involving sehen were found, whereas hören 
attests only 18 complementizer clauses (4% of total token count) and 6 
parentheticals (1.3%).12 Although both are low-frequency phenomena, the 
complementizer clauses occur much more often. Whether these provide the 
diachronic origin of the parentheticals – as has been suggested by Thompson 
and Mulac (1991) and Boye (2012, 212-213) – cannot be assessed with only 
the current data, as investigations into the earlier stages of German would be 
necessary.13 
 Regarding the wh-complementizer clauses in (17) and (18), Whitt 
(2010, 95-96, 158-160) and Boye (2010b, 405) have argued that these 
constructions indicate perception of the manner in which something occurred 
or was done, rather than for the entire proposition itself. So in (17), the author 
is indicating there is visual evidence available as to the degree to which dogs 
and cats can get along when living together, while in (18), the speaker indicates 
that he has directly perceived the manner in which a doctor expresses self-
praise (extremely loud shouting). Whitt (2010, 95-96, 158-160) argues that 
only perceptual evidence is available for the manner of the events that are 
indicated, but Boye (p.c.) has pointed out that because these complementizers 
scope over the entire proposition nonetheless, they can still be considered as 
evidence for the entire proposition. So in (17), although only the manner of 
cats and dogs getting along is being highlighted by wie, the actual proposition 
(diese zwey Thiere vertragen sich wol in einem Hause ‘the two animals are 
getting along in one house’) still falls within the scope of the complementizer, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12Of the 85 complement constructions involving sehen, 41 (48.2%) were 
considered to be only markers of direct visual perception and not inference. On 
the other hand, all of the complement constructions involving hören were 
markers of hearsay and not of direct auditory perception. The trend is similar 
with parentheticals, where 5 of the 6 (83.3%) hören parentheticals are markers 
of hearsay, but 14 of the 18 (77.8%) parentheticals with sehen involved direct 
perception without regard to inference. 
13Timofeeva’s (2013, 177ff.) study of hearsay evidentials in the oldest 
Germanic languages reveals both complementizer and parenthetical 




and thus there is visual evidence that the proposition holds true. And in (18), 
that a certain doctor is making a scene in the market square is indicated earlier 
in the discourse, and the wie-clause here simply indicates he is praising himself 
in a very loud fashion. Of course, this auditory perception serves as evidence 
that the noises are the doctor’s self-praises. These evidential wh-
complementizer constructions are lower in frequency than dass-
complementizer constructions: there are only 22 cases (1.5%) of sehen and 7 
(1.5%) of hören occurring in the matrix clause followed by a wh-
complementizer clause in the GerManC Corpus. 
4.2.2 Direct Object + Infinitive Constructions 
We now turn our attention to cases where perception verbs take a direct object 
and infinitive as their complements. Although such construction in the 
Germanic languages are generally treated as evidential (Chafe 1986, 267-268; 
Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008, 176-178; Diewald & Smirnova 2010, 47ff.; 
Whitt 2009, 2010; Timofeeva 2013), Boye (2010a, 2010b, 2012) has recently 
argued against such an analysis on the grounds that in such a construction, the 
perception verb has scope over a state-of-affairs but not a proposition, and 
therefore it cannot be evidential (a similar argument is implied by Matlock 
1989, 216). Let us consider some AcI constructions from the GerManC corpus: 
(21) Ferner so habe ich auch selbst einsmahls eine Magd von einem Obst-
Marckte gehen sehen welche unterwegens von den eingekaufften 
Früchten unauffhörlich naschte und die schönsten heraus suchte, biß sie 
zuletzt, als sie bald an das Haus kam, wo sie hinein gehörete, wenig 
mehr in ihren Korbe übrig hatte, daß sie also sich gezwungen sahe 
wieder umzukehren und ander Obst zu kauffen, welches der Lohn vor 
ihr Naschen war . . . 
‘Furthermore even I myself once saw a servant girl leaving a fruit 
market, who, while returning home, unceasingly nibbled on the fruit 
she had bought, until when she nearly arrived back at the house to 
which she belonged, she realized she hardly had any fruit left, and thus 
was forced to return to the fruit market and buy more fruit, which was 
the price for her nibbling . . .’ 
(HUMA_P2_OMD_1717_DienstMaegde: Marforius, Kurtze 
Beschreibung Des zum theil liederlichen Lebens und Wandels Derer 
anjetzo in grossen Städten sich befindenden Dienst-Mägde, Leipzig 
1717) 
(22) Ihr machet mich bestützet/ (sagte die Königin) die ich allemal so viel 
tugend an der Mirina preisen hören: zu dem daß sie aus einem 
geschlechte und volk entsproßen ist/ so das laster/ dessen ihr sie 
beschüldiget/ überaus hassete und meidete. 
 ‘You make me distressed (said the queen), you whom I have always 
heard praise Mirina for her great virtue, since she comes from a lineage 
and people which have utterly detested and avoided the vice of which 
you accuse her.’ 
 (NARR_P1_OOD_1669_Aramena: Anton Ulrich (von Braunschweig), 
Die durchleuchtige Syrerin Aramena Der Zweyte Theil: Der 
Beschwiegerten Freundschaft gewidmet, Nuremberg 1669)  
In the standard analysis of such constructions (as is found, for example, in 
Whitt 2010, 30-31 et passim), the perception verb is taken as indicating 
evidence for the complement containing the accusative object (or the agent of 
perceived action) and the verbal infinitive. So in (21), the writer has direct 
visual evidence of a servant girl leaving the fruit market and nibbling on the 
fruits she just purchased, while in (22), the Queen reports she has heard the 
prince’s praises of Mirina on a number of occasions. Boye (2010a, 2010b, 
2012) has repeatedly argued against such an analysis of these constructions, 
arguing that AcI constructions do not take propositions in their scope, but only 
states-of-affairs. The actions described are “objects of perception” and there is 
not an “acquisition of knowledge” indicated in such constructions (as there is 
in complementizer constructions), for the action described is allegedly 
construed as concurrent with the act of perception (Boye 2010b, 396). Any 
indication that this perception serves as evidence for what is described comes 
after the fact, and it is therefore “implied” but not “expressed” (Boye 2012, 
213), cf. Anderson’s (1986, 274) ban on a marker whose evidential meaning 
arises solely by means of inference as being considered a true evidential. 
 Such an analysis, although conceivable with Boye’s decontextualized 
examples (see (1) and (2)), appears problematic when one considers the 
broader discourse context of the above examples. In (21), for example, the 
author is engaging in an extended diatribe against the perceived inherent 
dishonesty of servant girls and is warning all those who engage such servants 
to be on guard against thievery and other such moral ills. He first discusses 
shifty behavior which he has heard servant girls engage in (using a hearsay 
evidential). Then – to emphasize the reality of the dishonesty found among 
servant girls – he describes a situation he once witnessed directly, and even 
adds the reflexive selbst ‘myself’ to emphasize the fact that the incident at the 
	  
	  
fruit market was indeed witnessed by him. His direct visual perception of the 
servant girl’s actions thus adds credibility to his account, and the fact that his 
vision serves as his evidence does not arise by mere implicature. In (22), the 
Queen indicates she is perplexed by her brother’s allegations against Mirina, 
noting she has heard only praiseworthy things about Mirina (she has direct 
auditory evidence of Mirina’s virtuous character). That she has heard these 
praises directly adds credibility to her assertion, as does the writer’s direct 
perception of the servant girl’s actions in (21). In these contexts, it is difficult 
to see how the evidence indicated by the perception verbs can be written off as 
pragmatic implicatures within Boye’s framework. Even if there is no 
proposition aside from the denotation of the perceptual act – as the act of 
perception is certainly indicated as concurrent with the states-of-affairs being 
described – the actual utterance itself would occur at least after the initial act of 
perception begins, so the speaker’s knowledge will have already been informed 
by the perceptual act before this is realized linguistically. In (21), for example, 
the author will have already witnessed the servant girl’s action before he wrote 
his diatribe. So although the AcI construction does indicate a state-of-affairs in 
the scope of the perception verb rather than a proposition, the larger discourse 
contexts surrounding these utterances suggest that the perceptual acts being 
mentioned serve as explicit indications of evidence for the claims being made, 
as well as subsequent conclusions based on this perceptual evidence.14 
 Given the larger discourse context, Boye (p.c.) acknowledges that 
examples such as those above can serve an evidential function. That is, 
although there is no proposition to scope over in the direct object construction 
itself, the construction as a whole can serve as evidence for a proposition 
elsewhere in the discourse. In his own words: “the description of a perception 
of an event may in a wider discourse serve as evidence for an (implicit, explicit 
or deducible) proposition.”15 This is different from propositional coercion, 
however, in that the proposition is found elsewhere in the discourse, or inferred 
altogether from the discourse context; with propositional coercion, the 
proposition can be coerced from the immediate syntactic environment (as is the 
case with copula uses of scheinen). So in (21), for example, we can construe a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14It is worth noting that Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008, 176-178) also 
consider AcI construction denoting states-of-affairs and not propositions, but 
they do not believe this precludes evidential meaning. Boye (2010a, 194-196), 
of course, argues against such an analysis.	  
15In a similar vein, Boye has argued elsewhere (contra Anderson) that 
evidential meaning should not be divorced from pragmatic context, i.e. certain 
items may signal an evidential reading in certain contexts and not in others 
(Boye & Harder 2009, 23ff.).	  
proposition that servant girls are dishonest and untrustworthy, and the AcI 
construction serves as evidence for this. Similarly, the proposition that Mirina 
is virtuous is supported by the AcI construction indicating that the Queen has 
heard Minira praised repeatedly for such virtue. Hence these AcI constructions 
may not be evidential in and of themselves in the way that complementizer 
constructions are, but they are nevertheless capable of serving an evidential 
function in their respective discourse contexts. 
 Another objection Boye (2010a, 296; 2012, 218-219) has to considering 
AcI constructions evidential is that they are incapable of, or have never been 
attested as, providing the source construction for more grammaticalized 
expressions of evidentiality, where “true” evidential constructions like 
complementizer clause constructions supposedly can and do. This is based 
mainly on Thompson and Mulac’s (1991) matrix clause hypothesis, the 
feasibility of which has been called into question by a number of recent studies 
(Brinton 2008; Timofeeva 2013; López-Couso & Méndez-Naya 2014). 
Granted, it has long been acknowledged that perception verbs can serve as the 
lexical origins for grammaticalized markers of evidentiality (Anderson 1986; 
Willett 1988; Aikhenvald 2004), but I am unaware of any evidentialist beside 
Boye (2010a, 2012) claiming that, in order for a lexical use of a perception 
verb to be deemed evidential, it must first be considered a (potential) 
diachronic precursor to a grammaticalized evidential marker. Boye also 
overlooks the fact that certain AcI constructions in Germanic have undergone a 
complex (re)lexicalization process from markers of direct auditory perception 
to markers of hearsay (Ich höre X sagen > Ich höre sagen > Hörensagen ‘I 
hear X say > I hear say > hearsay’) (Timofeeva 2013, 189-192; Kotin 2011, 
41-46; cf. Traugott & Trousdale 2013, 149ff.).16 Although no such evidential 
construction was found in the GerManC corpus, these other studies 
demonstrate that non-grammaticalized AcI constructions are not so 
diachronically homogenous and static as Boye would have it. 
 All in all, there are a total of 41 evidential AcI constructions involving 
sehen and 11 involving hören in the GerManC Corpus, representing 2.7% and 
2.4% of the total token counts, respectively. Both verbs are almost exclusively 
markers of direct, external perception in such constructions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16One could argue, along the lines of Boye and Harder (2009), that the phrase I 
hear say/Ich höre sagen is grammaticalized to the same degree as expressions 
such as they say and it seems are, insofar as it serves a secondary function of 
indicating hearsay evidence for an expressed proposition, rather than being the 
main predication. Thus it is at least conceivable that certain AcI constructions 
can serve as source constructions for grammaticalization. 
	  
	  
4.2.3 External Constructions 
There is one construction that is structurally related to the AcI construction, but 
here, there is only an accusative object – generally in the form of a pronoun – 
present, and this pronoun relates not to a specific referent, but rather to a chunk 
of discourse either preceding or following the construction involving the 
perception verb. 
(23) Wir sehns sie hintergehn den Fürsten noch durch List. 
‘We see it – they are still craftily deceiving the Prince.’ 
(DRAM_P1_WMD_1662_Tomyris: Hieronymus Thomæ, Titus und 
 Tomyris Oder Traur-Spiel, beygenahmt Die rachbegierige Eyfersucht, 
 Giessen 1662) 
(24) Hausvater. Wie sagen sie heißt der, welcher meinen Sohn soll  
  gefodert haben? 
       Dromer. Nechrostfeld. 
 Hausvater. Sind sie zuverläßig benachrichtiget, daß er das vom  
   Ferdinand sagt. 
 Dromer. Ich hört es aus seinem eignen Munde.  
 ‘Hausvater. What do they call the one who supposedly was asking 
   for my son? 
Dromer. Nechrostfeld. 
Hausvater. Are you reliably informed that he said that of Ferdinand? 
Dromer. I heard it from his own mouth.’ 
(DRAM_P3_WMD_1780_Hausvater: Otto Heinrich von 
Gemmingen-Hornberg, Der deutsche Hausvater, 
Mannheim 1780) 
It is difficult to say how these types of constructions would fit into Boye’s 
(2010a, 2010b, 2012) model of evidential constructions. On the one hand, as 
direct object constructions, they could be said to have scope only over states-
of-affairs rather than propositions (but still serve evidential functions in the 
broader discourse context). On the other hand, given the perception clause and 
the clause for which there is evidence are separated syntactically (as with 
complementizer clauses), the perception verb could also be argued to have 
scope over propositions via discourse anaphora (in (24)) or cataphora (in (23)). 
Whichever analysis one chooses, these types of constructions clearly serve an 
evidential function. In (23), Tomyris indicates that she and others are 
witnessing the prince being deceived (visual evidence). And in (24), Dromer 
confirms to the family patriarch that Nechrostfeld is requesting to see 
Ferdinand because he has heard these requests himself (first-hand mediated 
evidence). These are very low-frequency constructions, with only 13 (0.9%) 
external constructions involving sehen and 3 (0.7%) involving hören found in 
the entire corpus. 
4.2.4 Summary of sehen and hören 
The GerManC data reveal the perception verbs sehen and hören mark 
evidential meaning in a number of different complementation patterns. Indirect 
evidence (such as inference and hearsay) tends to be marked in 
complementizer clause constructions and parentheticals. And although Boye’s 
(2010a, 2010b, 2012) assertion that evidential markers do not scope over 
states-of-affairs may well hold true, contextualized readings of AcI 
constructions show that these constructions as a whole can still serve evidential 
functions when seen in their full discourse context. In line with earlier findings 
(Whitt 2009, 2010), AcI constructions are almost exclusively markers of direct 
perceptual evidence. And the low-frequency external constructions attest both 
direct and indirect evidential uses of perception verbs. As with scheinen, no 
connection between the use of evidential perception verbs and register could be 
established. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has presented an overview of evidential markers in Early Modern 
German (1650-1800) in light of Boye’s notion of propositional scope. 
Regarding scheinen, Boye’s (2012) notion of propositional coercion sheds new 
light on evidential uses of certain copular constructions, which previous 
accounts held to be non-evidential (Diewald & Smirnova 2010). In addition, 
his more general comments on propositional scope fully allow for dass-
complementizer and parenthetical constructions to be considered evidential 
markers. The GerManC data do confirm Diewald and Smirnova’s (2010) 
general diachronic account of the grammaticalization of scheinen with zu-
Infinitive complements, but the data also contradict their analysis of what 
should and what should not be considered evidential. Perception verbs are less 
	  
	  
straightforward, as complementizer clauses and parentheticals show clear 
propositional scope, whereas AcI constructions appear to draw Boye’s claim 
that evidential markers cannot scope over states-of-affairs into question. 
Although Boye has maintained this stance, he has further elaborated on this 
position, acknowledging that AcI constructions as a whole can scope over 
propositions (either implicit or explicit) elsewhere in the discourse (p.c.). This 
paper has thus demonstrated that, although robust formal or semantic criteria 
for the delineation of evidential markers – such as those put forward by Boye – 
can shed new light on data, the larger discourse context surrounding the use of 
evidential markers is equally important. This is especially true for the 
Germanic languages, where there is not a devoted set of evidential inflections 
available to speakers, but rather a range of items that can be used evidentially, 
given specific formal and discourse environments. And both factors must be 
taken into consideration when accounting for the presence or absence of 
evidential meaning, in either a synchronic or diachronic perspective. 
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